United States v. Murray by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-13-1998 
United States v. Murray 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"United States v. Murray" (1998). 1998 Decisions. 111. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/111 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed May 13, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
NO. 97-7196 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL MURRAY, 
       Appellant 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 92-00200-04) 
 
Argued: November 7, 1997 
 
Before: BECKER, ROTH, Circuit Judges, and DIAMOND, 
District Judge.* 
 
(Filed May 13, 1998) 
 
       DAVID A. RUHNKE, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Ruhnke & Barrett 
       47 Park Street 
       Montclair, NJ 07042 
 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Honorable Gustave Diamond, United States District Judge for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
  
       DAVID M. BARASCH, ESQUIRE 
       United States Attorney 
       WILLIAM A. BEHE, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Assistant United States Attorney 
       Office of the United States Attorney 
       Federal Building 
       225 Walnut Street 
       P.O. Box 11755 
       Harrisburg, PA 17108 
 
       Counsel for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER,** Chief Circuit Judge. 
 
Michael Murray appeals for the second time from a 
judgment in a criminal case.1 In his first appeal, a panel of 
this court vacated one count of his conviction, affirmed two 
others, and remanded for resentencing on the affirmed 
counts. Murray now challenges the sentences imposed on 
remand. His appeal raises interesting and difficult 
questions concerning the contours of the so-called 
Sentencing Package Doctrine (the "doctrine") under the 
regime of the Sentencing Guidelines. Rejecting Murray's 
several contentions, we hold that the district court had the 
authority to resentence Murray on the affirmed counts; that 
there is no constitutional barrier to the district court 
imposing life sentences on those counts; that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion by departing from the 
applicable guideline range; and that the extent of the 
departure was reasonable. We therefore affirm the 
judgment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
** Honorable Edward R. Becker, United States Circuit Judge for the 
Third Circuit, assumed Chief Judge status on February 1, 1998. 
 
1. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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I. 
 
Murray was convicted following a jury trial of the 
intentional killing of Juan Carlos Bacallo in furtherance of 
a Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE"), in violation of 21 
U.S.C. S 848(e)(1)(A); conspiracy to distribute in excess of 
five (5) kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 846 
and 841(a)(1); and distribution of and possession with the 
intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(a)(1). On January 19, 1996, Murray was sentenced to 
a term of life imprisonment for the CCE-related murder and 
to two concurrent ten-year sentences on the drug counts.2 
Murray timely appealed his convictions, and, in United 
States v. Murray, 103 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1997) (Murray I), a 
panel of this court reversed Murray's conviction on the 
murder charge on the ground of trial error.3 The panel was 
careful to indicate at various points that the errors did not 
require reversal of Murray's drug convictions. At the 
conclusion of the opinion, the panel stated: 
 
       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of 
       conviction and sentence on the murder charge and 
       remand for a new trial. We affirm the judgment of 
       conviction as to the drug charges and remand for 
       resentencing, if appropriate, on those counts. 
 
103 F.2d at 323. 
 
On remand, the government took the position that the 
district court could permissibly vacate the concurrent ten- 
year terms imposed on the two drug counts and resentence 
Murray to life imprisonment -- thus obviating the need (in 
practical terms) for a retrial on the murder charge. Murray 
objected to this procedure, but the district court proceeded 
with the resentencing. A revised presentence report ordered 
by the district court advised that the guideline level for 
Murray's drug offenses was 34, and that the murder of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Murray was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,304.00 
to the murder victim's family. 
 
3. More specifically, the reversal was based upon the admission of 
evidence that the court determined to be inappropriate under 
Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) and 403, as well as evidence that contravened 
Fed.R.Evid. 608(b). 
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Bacallo was relevant conduct which could justify an 
upward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.1 (Death); 
and S 5K2.8 (Extreme Conduct). On April 10, 1997, the 
district court departed upwards and resentenced Murray to 
two concurrent terms of life imprisonment on the drug 
counts and imposed a $10,000 fine. 
 
At the resentencing, the district court gave the following 
reasons for its departure: 
 
       The Court believes that there is clear and convincing 
       evidence that the defendant committed murder. The 
       killing of Juan Carlos Bacallo is relevant conduct 
       associated with the defendant's offense of conviction 
       and is an integral, aggravating circumstance not 
       covered by the offense guideline. 
 
       The most analogous guideline to this relevant conduct 
       is United States Sentencing Guidelines S 2A1.1 and 
       offense level 43. Further, the dangerousness of the 
       defendant's conduct, his intent prior to the killing and 
       the cruel nature of the killing present the need for a 
       consequence and a departure under the United States 
       Sentencing Guideline 5K.1 and section 5K2.8 for the 
       loss of life caused by the defendant and his extreme 
       conduct. 
 
       An upward departure of nine levels is deemed 
       reasonable, and the sentence imposed is considered 
       necessary after consideration of the nature and 
       seriousness of the offense and the need to afford an 
       adequate deterrent as required by 18 U.S.C. S 3553. 
 
In addition, the district court entered into the record an 
Addendum to Statement of Reasons for the departure 
wherein it stated: 
 
       It is noted that because the drug convictions involved 
       more than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 
       S 841(b)(1)(A) reflects that the Court must impose a 
       sentence of no less than 10 years and can impose life 
       imprisonment. While it appears that the court can not 
       use the intentional killing in determining the 
       defendant's guideline calculations, it is relevant 
       conduct and can therefore be used in support of a 
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       substantial upward depart at resentencing on the drug 
       counts. [See also United States v. Baird, No. 96-1342, 
       slip op. (3d Cir. March 19, 1997)] 
 
This appeal followed. The government informed us at oral 
argument that it does not intend to retry Murray on the 
murder charge if the resentencing on the drug counts is 
affirmed. 
 
II. 
 
Murray first contends that the district court was without 
authority to resentence him on the drug counts. This 
argument is foreclosed by this court's mandate in Murray I. 
There the panel "affirm[ed] the judgment of conviction as to 
the drug charges and remand[ed] for resentencing, if 
appropriate, on those counts." 103 F.2d at 323. While the 
wording of the mandate, and in particular the use of the 
phrase if appropriate, may be imprecise, there is no doubt 
that the prior panel vacated Murray's drug sentences and 
remanded for the district court to at least consider 
resentencing on the drug counts. Such a mandate does not 
impose any additional restriction, other than those provided 
by applicable statutes, constitutional provisions, and the 
Guidelines, on a district court's ability to fashion de novo a 
new sentence on remand. 
 
Because of the mandate, Murray's claim that the district 
court lacked the authority to resentence him reduces to an 
attack on this court's authority, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 2106 (1997), to vacate the sentences on the drug counts 
and remand for resentencing. This argument is derived 
from United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1981), 
wherein we faced, inter alia, the question whether it was 
permissible to vacate a sentence imposed on an 
unchallenged count of a multicount conviction where the 
conviction on another count was overturned. We 
determined that "[i]n such a case, where the sentences were 
interdependent, we believe an appellate court, vacating one 
of those sentences, can vacate the other sentence even if its 
imposition is not specifically raised on appeal." Id. at 947 
(emphasis supplied); see also id. at 947 n.10. 
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Based on this language, which gave rise to what has 
since been termed the sentencing package doctrine, Murray 
argues that resentencing is inappropriate in this case since 
his drug sentences were ordered to be served concurrently 
to his murder sentence, and hence the sentences were not 
interdependent. This argument raises interesting and 
difficult questions regarding the breadth of the doctrine and 
its continued relevance in the era of Guideline sentencing. 
However, we need not reach these issues here.4 Unlike the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The sentencing package doctrine originated as a means of justifying 
the resentencing of a defendant on all counts of a multicount conviction 
where one or more counts were reversed on direct appeal. The rationale 
underlying the doctrine was that 
 
       [w]hen a defendant is found guilty on a multicount indictment, 
there 
       is a strong likelihood that the district court will craft a 
disposition 
       in which the sentences on the various counts form part of an 
overall 
       plan. When the conviction on one or more of the component counts 
       is vacated, common sense dictates that the judge should be free to 
       review the efficacy of what remains in light of the original plan, 
and 
       to reconstruct the sentencing architecture upon remand, within 
       applicable constitutional and statutory limits, if that appears 
       necessary in order to ensure that the punishment still fits both 
       crime and criminal. 
 
United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1989). The 
sentencing package doctrine was deemed applicable when the sentences 
on the underlying counts were interdependent. See e.g., United States v. 
Shue, 825 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 1987). However, at the time the 
doctrine was announced, and throughout its early years of application, 
the Sentencing Guidelines were not yet in place. In the pre-Guidelines 
era, the determination whether particular sentences arising from a 
multicount indictment were truly "interdependent" did not cause some 
courts much concern, as they apparently assumed that interdependence 
was a necessary by-product of the virtually unfettered sentencing 
discretion of the district court. Other courts, however, still expressed 
concern about the application of the doctrine in the context of 
concurrent sentences, as we discuss infra. 
 
The question of interdependence is more complex under the 
Guidelines. As several of our sister circuits have noted, the Guidelines 
have eliminated much of the district court's discretion at sentencing, 
thereby altering, though not necessarily eliminating, the concept of a 
sentencing package. See United States v. Rodriguez, 112 F.3d 26, 30 (1st 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Smith, 103 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 1996). In 
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defendant in Busic, Murray did challenge his conviction on 
the drug counts. The Murray I panel's authority to remand 
for resentencing on those counts thus stems directly from 
 
(Text continued on page 9) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
some instances the change has not been that dramatic-- the Guidelines 
have simply shifted the power to create an appropriate sentencing 
package from the district court to the Guidelines themselves. An example 
of this phenomenon is provided by the facts of United States v. Davis, 
112 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 1997), which is representative of the cases 
applying the doctrine post-Guidelines. 
 
In Davis, the defendant had been convicted of several drug counts and 
one count of using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 
crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c). A conviction under S 924(c) 
requires, as a matter of law, the imposition of afive year sentence to be 
served consecutively to any other term of imprisonment associated with 
an underlying drug count. See 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1). Moreover, under 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(b)(1), the base offense level for crimes involving drugs 
must be increased by two levels if "a dangerous weapon (including a 
firearm) was possessed." U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(b)(1). The Guidelines further 
direct that this enhancement should not be applied when a sentence 
under S 924(c) is also imposed. See U.S.S.G. S 2K2.4, Commentary 
Background. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United 
States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), which narrowed the definition of the word 
"use" in S 924(c), Davis moved under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 seeking to vacate, 
set aside, or correct his sentence. The district court vacated the S 
924(c) 
sentence and ordered resentencing on the remaining counts. See Davis, 
112 F.3d at 120. Davis appealed the district court'sfinding of 
jurisdiction to recalculate his aggregate sentence, claiming that the 
court's authority under S 2255 to "correct the sentence" only extended to 
the specific sentence underlying his conviction under S 924(c). 
 
We disagreed, finding "jurisdiction based on the interdependence of the 
counts for Guideline sentencing purposes." Id. at 121. We explained our 
holding as follows: 
 
       Clearly, the S 924(c) offense and the underlying offense are 
       interdependent and result in an aggregate sentence, not sentences 
       which may be treated discretely. If the district court were to 
vacate 
       the term associated with the S 924(c) count and not resentence on 
       the remaining counts, Davis would not receive the two level 
       enhancement required for the remaining counts under the 
       Sentencing Guidelines and his sentence would not be in conformity 
       with the law. 
 
Id. at 121 (citations omitted). 
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The scenario in Davis provides a clear example of interdependence 
under the Guidelines since it is evident that the particular guidelines 
themselves "contemplate[d] an interdependent relationship between the 
sentence for the vacated conviction and the sentence for the remaining 
convictions -- a sentence package . . . ." Rodriguez, 112 F.3d at 30. The 
relationship between Murray's original sentences on the murder count 
and the drug counts is not analogous to that at issue in Davis since the 
guidelines applicable to these counts do not expressly contemplate 
interdependent sentences. Indeed, there was no barrier to the district 
court imposing, at the original sentencing, concurrent life terms on all 
counts. Nonetheless, the government makes a plausible argument that 
Murray's original sentences were interdependent because the district 
court structured those sentences in order to punish Murray for the 
intentional killing of Bacallo as part of his drug trafficking crimes. 
Thus, 
the government submits that the removal of the murder conviction and 
the attendant life sentence affected the court's sentencing package. This 
approach is supported by the district court's Addendum to Statement of 
Reasons wherein the court explains how its sentencing intention had 
been affected by the vacatur of the murder conviction and the life 
sentence. 
 
The government's argument is rooted in the notion of the sentencing 
package doctrine as it existed pre-Guidelines. The government contends 
that interdependence arises from the district court's discretion in 
crafting an overall sentence designed to punish the criminal and his 
conduct rather than from the workings of the Guidelines. Aside from the 
possibility that this argument, predicated on a sentencing court's 
discretion, may be foreclosed by the Guidelines, it is not apparent that 
the elastic notion of interdependence that the government advocates has 
ever been supportable under the sentencing package doctrine. Even pre- 
Guidelines, courts expressed concern with the application of the doctrine 
to concurrent sentences. See McClain v. United States, 676 F.2d 915, 
918 (2d Cir. 1982)(McClain II) (applying the doctrine but emphasizing 
that "[c]onsecutive sentences were mandatory in this case under section 
924(c) and the sentences were truly interdependent" and cautioning that 
the opinion was not "addressed to a situation involving concurrent or 
non-interlocking sentences. Where the sentencing judge could have 
insured against invalidation of a longer term by imposing a higher 
sentence for the other offense, vacatur of the shorter term might well be 
inappropriate . . . ."). This concern continues post-Guidelines. See 
United 
States v. Gordils, 117 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that McClain 
II is still good law post-Guidelines); United States v. McKnight, 17 F.3d 
1139, 1145 (8th Cir. 1994) (vacating each of three defendants' 
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28 U.S.C. S 2106, which we set forth in the margin.5 The 
authority granted by S 2106 is discretionary, and while the 
jurisprudence of sentencing, including the concepts 
underlying the sentencing package doctrine, serves as a 
guide to courts in making the determination whether 
remand is appropriate, the courts of appeals are not bound 
to apply these concepts in determining whether to remand 
for resentencing on counts "lawfully brought before [them] 
for review." Here, the panel did not state the reasons 
supporting its decision to remand the drug counts for 
resentencing. However, even if it had, and we disagreed 
with those reasons, the fact is that it has done so, and we 
are without authority on this appeal to substitute our views 
for those of the Murray I panel. 
 
III. 
 
Turning to the legality of the life sentences imposed on 
remand, we find Murray's arguments that his resentencing 
violates his due process rights and the prohibition against 
double jeopardy to be without merit.6 Murray's due process 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
convictions on a false misrepresentation count, but determining that 
remand for resentencing on that count was unnecessary since the 
sentences "were ordered to be served concurrently to the sentences on 
the other counts, now affirmed"). 
 
As the foregoing makes clear, the application of the sentencing 
package doctrine to the concurrent sentences involved in this case is by 
no means a foregone conclusion. However, as we explain, this case does 
not turn on an application of the sentencing package doctrine, and thus 
we intimate no view on whether the government's broad conception of 
interdependence is ultimately supportable -- leaving that decision to 
another day. 
 
5. "The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may 
affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or 
order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand 
the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or 
order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just 
under the circumstances." 28 U.S.C. S 2106 (emphasis supplied). 
 
6. We exercise plenary review over challenges to the legality of a 
sentence 
imposed by a district court. See United States v. Woods, 986 F.2d 669, 
673 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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claim is predicated on North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711 (1969). However, since his new sentences on the drug 
counts do not exceed the total length of his original 
sentence, and we find no evidence of vindictiveness on the 
part of the sentencing court, we reject this claim. See Kelly 
v. Neubert, 898 F.2d 15, 16 (3d Cir. 1990). Murray's double 
jeopardy claim is foreclosed by the fact that there can be no 
legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence and 
conviction which the defendant appeals. See United States 
v. Shue, 825 F.2d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation 
omitted); see also Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 
28, 30 (1985) (double jeopardy clause does not bar 
resentencing on counts affirmed on appeal when a sentence 
of imprisonment on another count is vacated). 
 
IV. 
 
Finally, Murray argues that the nine-level upward 
departure to a base offense level of 43 was not reasonable 
and should be reduced by this court.7 We disagree. The 
district court properly followed the course charted in United 
States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), for 
determining the appropriateness and extent of an upward 
departure. The district court found that the United States 
established by clear and convincing evidence that Murray 
had intentionally killed Bacallo, and that this relevant 
conduct associated with Murray's offenses of conviction was 
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. 
S 3553(b) (1997); Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1101 (fact finding 
underlying departure of such magnitude that the 
sentencing hearing can fairly be characterized as a`tail 
which wags the dog of the substantive offense' must be 
established at least by clear and convincing evidence). 
Having determined that a departure was appropriate, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We also exercise plenary review over the district court's construction 
of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 
1074, 1080 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1032 (1996). However, 
the decision to depart under the Guidelines is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, and deferential review is accorded to the extent of the 
departure. See United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 870, 872 (3d Cir. 
1997) (upward departure). 
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district court then properly turned to the Guidelines 
themselves to determine the extent of that departure. See 
id. at 1110-14 (setting out an "analogy to the Guideline 
approach" for determining the reasonableness of upward 
departures). Finding nothing infirm in the analogy applied, 
we determine that the nine level departure was reasonable. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
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